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Abstract
A symmetric device-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD) protocol is proposed in
this paper, with Holevo limit and subadditivity of von Neumann entropy, one can bound Eve’s
ability with collective attack. Together with symmetry of this protocol, the state Eve prepared for
Alice and Bob, and at the same time, her eavesdropping on Alice’s and Bob’s measurements can
be definitely inferred at the assumption that Eve aims at maximizing her information gain. The
optimal state under this circumstance can be solely bounded with Alice and Bob’s statistical results
on the quantity of Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) polynomial S, that is, our symmetric
DIQKD has the same secure basis as that of Ekert91 protocol.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an art of generating physically secure key between
remote partners, the information sender Alice, and the receiver Bob [1–3], even if in the
presence of a powerful eavesdropper, namely Eve, whose capability is only limited by quan-
tum mechanics. On one hand, the security proof of QKD has been obtained with nearly
perfect apparatus [4, 5]. On the other hand, there are different loopholes in current QKD
experiments that may injure the security of the final key bits [6–12]. Even with the perfect
experimental apparatus [4, 5], there are also some self-evident assumptions that guarantee
the security of final key bits. For instance, we have to assume that Alice and Bob have the
freedom to choose the bases for their preparations and measurements. Their classical results
which is unwanted to be leaked out should be completely secret. At the same time, Alice
and Bob should entirely control their apparatus to generate the raw keys. Or else, the final
key bits cannot be secure.
As for commercial application, the apparatuses of Alice and Bob will be black boxes
that may be provided by their potential rivals. It is interesting how Alice and Bob can
determine the security of their final key bits extracted from these black boxes? Recently,
the device-independent QKD (DIQKD) [13–15] has been suggested to ask for the answer. It
was assumed in this protocol that Alice and Bob have no knowledge about their measure-
ment devices. The violation of CHSH inequality will impose restriction on Hilbert space
dimension of their measurements to ensure the efficient quantum correlations between Al-
ice and Bob [16, 17]. Secure key bits against collective attack for this protocol has been
proven [14, 15]. Its final key generation rate depends on two parameters, the quantity of
CHSH polynomial S and the quantum bit error rate (QBER) Q. These two parameters
are decided by the state measured by the legitimate users’ devices and the way of their
measurements at the same time. As Alice and Bob have no idea about the state prepared
by Eve, and their measurement devices can also be fabricated by their rivals, generalization
from collective attack to general attack is still missed.
The way of state preparation in DIQKD is the same as those of Ekert91 protocol [2]
and entanglement-based QKD protocol with sources in the middle [18, 19] where Eve’s
eavesdropping ability is bounded with collective attack as quantum De Finetti theorem can
be applied after Alice and Bob having randomized the measurement sequences on their
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states [20, 21]. In DIQKD, however, It is impossible for Alice and Bob to make sure that
their measurements function exactly on the quantum systems as their expectations. In fact,
Eve may devise Alice’s and Bob’s measurements differently in every run. In this paper, a
symmetric DIQKD protocol is proposed. The symmetry of this protocol, together with the
Holevo limit [22–24], will provide strong confinements on Eve’s eavesdropping. We show
Eve’s information is maximized when all states distributed to Alice and Bob are identically
prepared. Then the procedure of uniform their states is completed automatically, and Alice
and Bob can estimate their parameters by randomizing the sequences of their classical
results. Furthermore, Eve’s optimal state when her illegal information is maximized can be
solely bounded with Alice and Bob’s parameter S. Then our symmetric DIQKD has the
same secure basis as that of Ekert91 protocol.
II. A SYMMETRIC DIQKD PROTOCOL
Our DIQKD protocol is symmetric not only because Alice’s and Bob’s basis choices are
symmetric, but also because the statistical results generated from all bases are the same. It
works as follows. (1) N EPR pairs emit from the signal source set between Alice’s and Bob’s
labs. One particle of the EPR pair is sent to Alice and the other one is sent to Bob. (2) Both
Alice and Bob choose four expecting measurement bases as θ1 = σx, θ2 = (σx + σz)/
√
2,
θ3 = σz, θ4 = (−σx + σz)/
√
2 (As is shown in Fig. 1). In each run, Alice will randomly
measure the incoming particle in one of the four bases, and so does Bob. (3) After all
EPR pairs having been distributed, Alice and Bob announce the bases they used in each
run through their classical channels. (4) Alice and Bob randomize the sequences of their
classical results. They keep partial measurement results on the same bases as secrecy that
will be used to generate secure final key bits. Then they publish all the other measurement
results to estimate the disturbances and correlations on their sifted key bits. They abort
their communication if the parameter estimation fails to meet their predefined requirements.
Or else, they carry out privacy amplification to generate their secure final key.
Without loss of generality, we assume Eve prepares all Alice’s and Bob’s systems and her
auxiliary systems in a big state ρA1···NB1···NE . Noting Alice’s measurement operations as A1,
A2, A
′
1 and A
′
2, Bob’s measurement operations as B1, B2, B
′
1 and B
′
2, the joint measurements
of Alice’s and Bob’s devices can then be depicted as Au1i1 (t1)⊗Bv1j1 (t1) · · ·AuNiN (tN)⊗BvNiN (tN).
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FIG. 1: Schematic for symmetric DIQKD. Ais and A
′
is are Alice’s possible basis choices. Bjs and
B′js are Bob’s basis choices.
Here t1, · · · , tN are sorted in time sequence as Eve may eavesdrop on Alice’s and Bob’s
measurements differently in every run, u1, · · · , uN , v1, · · · , vN correspond to the upper
indexes, and i1, · · · , iN can be 1 or 2 randomly. As Eve’s measurements will not affect
the marginal distributions of Alice’s and Bob’s classical results, their results generated from
ρA1···NB1···NE can be depicted as Tr[A
u1
i1
(t1)⊗Bv1j1 (t1) · · ·AuNiN (tN)⊗BvNiN (tN)TrE(ρA1···NB1···NE)],
where TrE is the trace on Eve’s systems. According to DIQKD protocol, the result in the
kth run is Tr(Aukik (tk)⊗ Bvkik (tk)(TrA1···k−1k+1···NB1···k−1k+1···NE(ρA1···NB1···NE)) = akbk, where ak
and bk are the classical results obtained by Alice and Bob respectively. If they are binary,
taking −1 and 1 for example, it is proven that Aukik (tk) and Bvkik (tk) functioned on qubit
states [14, 15, 25–27]. Furthermore, A1k(tk), A2k(tk), B1k(tk) and B2k(tk) can be set in the
same plane x − z. Similarly, A′1k(tk), A′2k(tk), B′1k(tk) and B′2k(tk) can be set in another
plane x′ − z′ [14, 15].
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Defining TrA1···k−1k+1···NB1···k−1k+1···NE(ρA1···NB1···NE) ≡ ρkAB, the Hilbert space of Al-
ice and Bob as HAB, ρ
k
AB ∈ HAB and dimHAB ≤ 4 should be satisfied. Accord-
ing to Holevo limit [22–24], Eve’s ability to distinguish the state shared by Alice and
Bob is limited by S(TrE(ρA1···NB1···NE)), where S(ρ) = −Tr(ρ log2(ρ)) is the von Neu-
mann entropy. If writing ρA1···NB1···NE as ρA1···ss+1···NB1···ss+1···NE , S(TrE(ρA1···NB1···NE)) ≤
S(TrAs+1···NBs+1···NE(ρA1···NB1···NE)) + S(TrA1···sB1···sE(ρA1···NB1···NE)) is required for the sub-
additivity of entropy. With the same procedure, one can have S(TrE(ρA1···NB1···NE)) ≤
∑
k S(TrA1···k−1k+1···NB1···k−1k+1···NE(ρA1···NB1···NE)). The equality holds if and only if
TrE(ρA1···NB1···NE) can be written as N product systems shared between Alice and Bob,
that is, TrE(ρA1···NB1···NE) = ⊗Nk=1ρkAB.
Eve controls the transmission of quantum state, thus she can make ρkAB optimal for her
information gain. As dimHAB ≤ 4, projective measurements can be launched on ρkAB in a 4-
dimensional Hilbert space H , with HAB ⊆ H . Let
∑
l P
l
AB = I be projective measurements
in H , it is proven that S(
∑
l P
lρkABP
l) ≥ S(ρkAB). The equality holds if and only if ρkAB =
∑
l P
lρkABP
l [24]. That is,
∑
l P
lρkABP
l can be diagonalized in bases T = {τl} with τlτ †l = P l.
Defining Λ ≡∑l P lρkABP l = P−1ρkABP , then Λ is a diagonal matrix inH , and P is composed
with the basis vectors {τk}. Noticing Bell bases B = {ςl} is also a set of bases in H , there
should be a unitary operator U satisfying T = UB. Then one can have Λ = B−1U−1ρkABUB,
which means ρkAB can be diagonalized in Bell bases after it has been operated as U
−1ρkABU .
It is apparently that this process will not alter the amount of entanglement on ρkAB, and
Eve’s information gain is only determined by the elements of Λ. That is, the assumption that
the state ρkAB can be diagonlized on Bell bases will not affect Eve’s information gain, and at
the same time, it will not harm Eve’s ability to intervene Alice and Bob’s communication.
Then it does not loss any generality to assume ρkAB can be diagonalized on Bell bases so
long as both Alice’s and Bob’s marginal distributions are symmetric [14, 15].
Suppose the state distributed by Eve in the kth run is σkAB ≡ (1− pk)ρ|Φ+〉 + pk1ρ|Φ−〉 +
pk2ρ|Ψ+〉+pk3ρ|Ψ−〉, where pk = pk1+pk2+pk3, |Φ+〉 = 1√2(|00〉+ |11〉), |Φ−〉 = 1√2(|00〉−|11〉),
|Ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉), and |Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉). We now show that Eve’s information
on Alice and Bob’s results is maximized when all σkABs are identically prepared.
(I) When there are only two types of quantum states equiprobably prepared on Alice and
Bob’s N shared systems (This assumption does not loss any generality if these two states
are prepared to be the same), they can be denoted as σ
(α)
AB = (1 − p(α))ρ|Φ+〉 + p(α)1 ρ|Φ−〉 +
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p
(α)
2 ρ|Ψ+〉 + p
(α)
3 ρ|Ψ−〉 and σ
(β)
AB = (1 − p(β))ρ|Φ+〉 + p(β)1 ρ|Φ−〉 + p(β)2 ρ|Ψ+〉 + p(β)3 ρ|Ψ−〉. Then
Eve’s information gain on these states should be represented as N
2
S(σ
(α)
AB) +
N
2
S(σ
(β)
AB). If
the statistical state on the N entangled systems measured by Alice and Bob is σAB =
(1 − p)ρ|Φ+〉 + p1ρ|Φ−〉 + p2ρ|Ψ+〉 + p3ρ|Ψ−〉, we have p(α)1 = p(β)1 = p1, p(α)2 = p(β)2 = p2, and
p
(α)
3 = p
(β)
3 = p3 when Eve’s information gain is optimal.
(II) When there arem types of density matrixes equiprobably prepared by Eve, we assume
Eve’s illegal information is maximal only when all of them are identically prepared on the
N entangled systems between Alice and Bob. That is, S(σ
(α)
AB) + S(σ
(β)
AB) + · · ·+ S(σ(m)AB ) ≤
mS(σAB) is satisfied with the equality holds if and only if σ
(α)
AB = σ
(β)
AB = · · · = σ(m)AB = σAB.
Here σAB is the statistical expression on the N shared systems of Alice and Bob.
(III) When there are m + 1 types of states measured by Alice and Bob equiprobably,
Eve’s information gain on them can be written as SE =
N
m+1
[S(σ
(α)
AB) + S(σ
(β)
AB) + · · · +
S(σ
(m)
AB )+S(σ
(m+1)
AB )]. If the statistical expression for the first m types of states on the
m
m+1
N
systems is σ
(Ω)
AB = (1 − p(Ω))ρ|Φ+〉 + p(Ω)1 ρ|Φ−〉 + p(Ω)2 ρ|Ψ+〉 + p(Ω)3 ρ|Ψ−〉, SE can be bounded as
N
m+1
[mS(σ
(Ω)
AB) + S(σ
(m+1)
AB )] according to step (II). With simple calculation, one can obtain
its maximum value when σ
(Ω)
AB = σ
(m+1)
AB = σAB, with σAB being the statistical representation
of all N shared systems between Alice and Bob. In conclusion, Eve should prepare the state
on the N systems identically if she want to maximize her illegal information from Alice and
Bob’s communication. Then there is no need to randomize the measurement sequences to
make their states uniformly distributed. Quantum De Finetti theorem can be applied in
DIQKD protocol and Eve’s information can be bounded with collective attack [20, 21].
Alice and Bob may not infer Eve’s single intervention on their measurements in the kth
run because of quantum randomness. As their states are identically prepared, however, they
can deduce the equivalent operations averaged from all results. Denoting the equivalent
operations in x − z plane as A1, A2, B1 and B2, their directions are assumed to be θ1,
θ2, ϕ1 and ϕ2 respectively. Similarly, denoting the equivalent operations in x
′ − z′ plane
as A′1, A
′
2, B
′
1 and B
′
2, the corresponding directions for them are θ
′
1, θ
′
2, ϕ
′
1 and ϕ
′
2. The
CHSH polynomial can be calculated as S =
∑
i,j sign(3.5− i− j)Tr(AiBjσAB), and S ′ =
∑
i,j sign(3.5− i− j)Tr(A′iB′jσAB), with i, j = 1, or 2, and sign(x) getting the sign of x.
Our symmetric DIQKD protocol requires S = S ′, moreover, it requires that all sign(3.5 −
i − j)Tr(AiBjσAB)s and sign(3.5 − i− j)Tr(A′iB′jσAB)s have the same value S4 . Then one
can obtain p1 = p2, and θ2 − θ1 = pi2 , ϕ2 − ϕ1 = −pi2 , θ2 − ϕ1 = pi4 and θ1 − ϕ2 = pi4 , or
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θ2−θ1 = −pi2 , ϕ2−ϕ1 = pi2 , θ2−ϕ1 = −pi4 and θ1−ϕ2 = −pi4 . With the same procedure, we can
have the relationships among θ′1, θ
′
2, ϕ
′
1 and ϕ
′
2. It is interesting to find that measurements
satisfying the above relationships can be proven to maximize the value of S. For Alice and
Bob, bigger S means less disturbances, then Eve should have the measurements of Alice and
Bob in every run obeys the above relationships in order to conceal her existence.
Two important things may be reconsidered: what is the relationship between plane x− z
and x′ − z′ and whether should Eve prepares the states for A1, A2, B1, B2 and A′1, A′2,
B′1, B
′
2 with different systems? It is interesting to notice that both questions deal with the
relationship between measurements and information. And they can be answered at the same
time. If plane x−z does not coincide with plane x′−z′, they belong to different Hilbert spaces.
When Eve prepares the states on the same systems, generalized measurements are carried
out inevitably when Eve distributes them in two different Hilbert spaces. This process will
decrease Eve’s information gain on the state [24]. However, when Eve prepares the states on
plane x−z and x′−z′ with different systems, monogamy of entanglement means that Alice’s
and Bob’s results extracted on the same bases should be totally uncorrelated [28–30]. This
will increase QBER on the key, that is, she will risk to be detected on line without gaining
more information. Then for the sake of Eve’s optimal information gain, and concealing her
existence at the same time, the Hilbert space of x− z coincides with that of x′− z′, and the
states for them are prepared on the same systems correspondingly.
When p1 = p2, one can have the relationship p1 + p3 =
1
2
− S
4
√
2
. If the measurement
directions between Alice and Bob are well aligned, the QBER can be calculated as p1 + p3.
Or else, it should be written as Q = 1−(1−p−p3) cosϑ
2
, where ϑ is the included angle between
these measurement directions. This value is greater than that of the former. Then Alice’s
measurement bases should keep alignment with those of Bob, one can obtain S = 2
√
2[1 −
2Q], which is the same as that in [14, 15]. In practical implementation of DIQKD, Alice and
Bob can not obtain the value of p. Defining q ≡ p+ p3, we have q = 1− S2√2 = 2Q. But the
exact value of p1 and p3 is still unknown. As Eve’s information on σAB can be written as
S(σAB) = −(1− q + p3) log2(1− q + p3)− 2p1 log2 p1 − p3 log2 p3, however, we have p3 = q
2
4
and p1 =
q
2
− q2
4
when S(ρAB) is maximal. That is, the optimal state for Eve’s eavesdropping
is σoptimalAB = (1− q+ q
2
4
)ρ|Φ+〉+ (
q
2
− q2
4
)ρ|Φ−〉+ (
q
2
− q2
4
)ρ|Ψ+〉+
q2
4
ρ|Ψ−〉. Different to the cases
where Alice and Bob having full control of their measurement devices [31–33], color noise is
optimal for Eve in the DIQKD protocol. This is because Alice and Bob can calculate the
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value of p accurately in the former but they can only estimate the value of q in the latter.
Until to now, we have proven Eve’s optimal information to be S(σoptimalAB ). If its corre-
sponding quantity of CHSH polynomial is Soptimal, however, can Eve’s optimal information
be bounded as S(σoptimalAB ) when Alice and Bob’s statistical value of S is equal to S
optimal?
If not so, there must be another σoptimal′AB with which Eve can obtain more illegal informa-
tion. That is, S(σoptimal′AB ) > S(σ
optimal
AB ) is satisfied. According to the discussion above,
σoptimal′AB should also be represented as σ
optimal′
AB = (1− q′ + q
′2
4
)ρ|Φ+〉 + (
q′
2
− q′2
4
)ρ|Φ−〉 + (
q′
2
−
q′2
4
)ρ|Ψ+〉 +
q′2
4
ρ|Ψ−〉. Its corresponding S can be calculated to be less than 2
√
2(1 − q′). As
S(σoptimal′AB ) > S(σ
optimal
AB ), one can have S
optimal ≤ 2√2(1− q′) ≤ 2√2(1− q). For Alice and
Bob, great S means less information can be obtained Eve, which means Soptimal can bound
Eve’s illegal information. Generally, if the value of CHSH polynomial is S, Eve’s illegal
information should be less than E(S) = −1
4
(1 + S
2
√
2
) log2
1
4
(1 + S
2
√
2
)− 1
4
(1− S
2
√
2
) log2
1
4
(1−
S
2
√
2
) − (1
2
− S2
16
) log2(
1
4
− S2
32
). Thus, DIQKD can be bounded with the quantity of CHSH
polynomial, which means it has the same secure basis as that of Ekert91 protocol [2]. For
collective attack, Alice and Bob’s key generation can be represented as r = 1−H2(Q)− χ,
where H2(Q) = −Q log2Q− (1−Q) log2(1−Q) is the Shannon entropy and χ is the Holevo
limit [34, 35]. In our symmetric DIQKD, the lower bound of Alice and Bob’s key generation
rate can be estimated as r ≥ 1−H2(Q)− S(σoptimalAB ). If the relationship S = 2
√
2(1− 2Q)
is satisfied, the key rate of our DIQKD can be calculated as
r ≥ 1−H2(1
2
− S
4
√
2
)− E(S). (1)
III. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, a symmetric DIQKD has been proposed, where Eve’s ability of eaves-
dropping can be bounded with collective attack. That is, generalization on the security of
DIQKD from collective attack to general attack can be realized. Its security can be esti-
mated similarly as that of Ekert91 protocol, that is, determined by the quantity of CHSH
polynomial S. However, we have only considered an ideal case where the loss in the quantum
channel is not added in. In practical implementation of this protocol, there may be detect-
ing loophole because of imperfectly detecting efficiency [32, 33]. Especially, faking state
attack has been proposed to eavesdrop on DIQKD protocols with inefficient measurement
devices [36]. To make DIQKD more practically with present devices, however, proposition
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for experimental realization of this protocol has been given [37]. Besides its attractiveness
of practical application, DIQKD is physically interesting as it provides us a way to under-
stand the nonlocality of quantum principles, with which the legitimate users can set up
secure communication without any knowledge about their quantum objects. The author
thank helpful discussion from Q.-Y. Cai and X. Ma. This work is sponsored by the National
Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No 10905028) and HASTIT.
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Appendix A: Bounding Eve’s information with Holevo limit
In DIQKD, Alice and Bob measure on the state ρ prepared by Eve. According to the
Holevo limit, Eve’s illegal information on the results of Alice and Bob can be bounded with
S(ρ). If ρ is composed with many subsystems, that is, ρ = ρ1,2,··· ,n. S(ρ) can be proven to
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satisfy the relationship
S(ρ) ≤
n∑
i=1
S(ρi), (A1)
where ρi is the state functions with Alice and Bob’s measurements in the ith run. This
conclusion can easily be proven with Klein’s inequality S(ρ) ≤ −Tr(ρ log2 σ). Defining
ρ ≡ ρ1,2,··· ,n, σ ≡ ⊗ni=1ρi, and substituting them into the Klein’s inequality, we have
S(ρ1,2,··· ,n) ≤ −Tr(ρ1,2,··· ,n log2⊗ni=1ρi)
= −Tr(ρ1,2,··· ,n(log2
∏n
i=1 ρi))
= −Tr(ρ1,2,··· ,n(
∑n
i=1 log2 ρi))
=
∑n
i=1 S(ρi).
(A2)
The equality holds if and only if the state can be written as product states of n systems.
Appendix B: Diagonalizing ρAB on Bell bases
Suppose Pi is a complete set of orthogonal projectors and ρ is a density operator. Then
the entropy of the state σ ≡ ∑i PiρPi of the system after the measurement is at least as
greater as the original entropy
S(σ) ≥ S(ρ)). (B1)
This results can be verified easily with Klein’s inequality.
S(ρ) ≤ −Tr(ρ log2 σ)
= −Tr(∑i Piρ log2 σ)
= −Tr(∑i PiPiρ log2 σ)
= −Tr(∑i Piρ log2 σPi)
= −Tr(∑i PiρPi log2 σ)
= S(σ).
(B2)
If Pis are the set of projective operators which can maximize Eve’s information after it has
functioned on state ρ. Writing Pi as τiτ
†
i , then T = {τi} is the basis of the Hilbert space of
ρ, and ρ is diagonal in basis T = {τi}. Then σ is the diagonalized density matrix of ρ on
basis T = {τi}.
Now we will show ρ can be diagonalized in any other set of bases of the Hilbert space
of ρ. If Qis are another set of projective operators in this Hilbert space, and Qi = ςiς
†,
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V = {ςi}s are also orthogonal bases of the Hilbert space of ρ. Similarly, we can define
matrixQ constituting of bases V = {ςi}, then there exists a unitary matrix U , with which the
relationship P = UQ can be satisfied. We can rewrite density matrix σ as σ = Q−1U−1ρUQ.
That is, ρ can be diagonalized on basis V = {ςi} after Eve operating it as U−1ρU . That
is, if a quantum state can be diagonalized on one basis in the Hilbert space of ρ, it can be
diagonalized on any other bases in this Hilbert space by just rotating the states with some
unitary operation.
In DIQKD, Alice’s and Bob’s classical results are binary, it is proven that their measure-
ments can extract qubit information from the states on the incoming particles. Then the
state measured by Alice’s and Bob’s devices are confined in the Hilbert space HAB, with
dimHAB ≤ 4. That is, Bell basis is a set of basis in this Hilbert space. Then if Eve can
diagonalize state ρ with projective operators in the Hilbert space of HAB, she can diagonalize
it on Bell basis.
Appendix C: Alice and Bob’s states should be identically prepared if Eve want her
illegal information maximized
This conclusion can be proven with simple mathematical technique. Suppose there are
m types states prepared for Alice and Bob.
(1) When m = 1, all states are identical.
(2) Whenm = 2, they are denoted as ρ
(α)
AB = (1−p(α))ρ|Φ+〉+p(α)1 ρ|Φ−〉+p(α)2 ρ|Ψ+〉+p(α)3 ρ|Ψ−〉
and ρ
(β)
AB = (1−p(β))ρ|Φ+〉+p(β)1 ρ|Φ−〉+p(β)2 ρ|Ψ+〉+p(β)3 ρ|Ψ−〉. And their statistical representation
of all systems can be written as ρAB = (1− p)ρ|Φ+〉 + p1ρ|Φ−〉 + p2ρ|Ψ+〉 + p3ρ|Ψ−〉. These two
types of states are assumed to be prepared equiprobably, and this assumption does not loss
any generality if these two types of states can be proven to be the same.
Then Eve’s information gain on these states should be less than N
2
[S(ραAB) + S(ρ
β
AB)],
with N is the number of the total systems shared between Alice and Bob. One can then
have
p
(α)
1 + p
(β)
1 = 2p1,
p
(α)
2 + p
(β)
2 = 2p2,
p
(α)
3 + p
(β)
3 = 2p3,
(C1)
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and
SE =
N
2
[S(ραAB) + S(ρ
β
AB)]
= −p(α)1 log2 p(α)1 − p(α)2 log2 p(α)2 − p(α)3 log2 p(α)3
−(1− p(α)1 − p(α)2 − p(α)3 ) log2((1− p(α)1 − p(α)2 − p(α)3 ))
−p(β)1 log2 p(β)1 − p(β)2 log2 p(β)2 − p(β)3 log2 p(β)3
−(1− p(β)1 − p(β)2 − p(β)3 ) log2((1− p(β)1 − p(β)2 − p(β)3 ))
(C2)
Substituting the relation in Eq. (7) into Eq. (8), we have SE = SE(p
(α)
1 , p
(α)
2 , p
(α)
3 ). Varying
p
(α)
1 , p
(α)
2 , and p
(α)
3 to make SE maximal, we can then have p
(α)
1 = p
(β)
1 = p1, p
(α)
2 = p
(β)
2 = p2,
and p
(α)
3 = p
(β)
3 = p3.
(3) Suppose all types of states are identically prepared on theN systems for Eve’s maximal
information gain when m = M ≥ 3. That is, Eve should make her eavesdropping optimal
if M types of states are prepared on the N systems shared between Alice and Bob, ρ
(α)
AB =
ρ
(β)
AB = · · · = ρ(M)AB = ρAB are required, with ρAB is the statistical state on the N systems.
That is, SE =
N
M
[S(ρ
(α)
AB) + S(ρ
(β)
AB) + · · · + S(ρ(M)AB )] = NS(ρAB) calculates the optimal
information obtain by Eve.
(4) When m = M + 1, we still assume all states are prepared equiprobably. Then SE =
N
M+1
[S(ρ
(α)
AB) + S(ρ
(β)
AB) + · · ·+ S(ρ(M)AB ) + S(ρ(M+1))]. Suppose the statistical representation
for the first M types of density matrix is ρΩAB,
SE =
N
M+1
[S(ρ
(α)
AB) + S(ρ
(β)
AB)) + · · ·+ S(ρ(M)AB ) + S(ρ(M+1))]
= M
M+1
N
M
[S(ρ
(α)
AB) + S(ρ
(β)
AB)) + · · ·+ S(ρ(M)AB )] + NM+1S(ρ(M+1))
≤ NM
M+1
S(ρΩAB) +
N
M+1
S(ρ(M+1)).
(C3)
Denoting ρΩAB = (1 − p(Ω))ρ|Φ+〉 + p(Ω)1 ρ|Φ−〉 + p(Ω)2 ρ|Ψ+〉 + p(Ω)3 ρ|Ψ−〉, and ρ(M+1)AB = (1 −
p(M+1))ρ|Φ+〉+p
(M+1)
1 ρ|Φ−〉+p
(M+1)
2 ρ|Ψ+〉+p
(M+1)
3 ρ|Ψ−〉, with similar procedure as that in step
(2), we have p
(Ω)
1 = p
(M+1)
1 = p1, p
(Ω)
2 = p
(M+1)
2 = p2, and p
(Ω)
3 = p
(M+1)
3 = p3. That is, the
M+1 types of states are also required to be identical for Eve’s optimal eavesdropping. Then
all states on the N systems shared between Alice and Bob should be identically prepared if
Eve want to maximize her illegal information.
Appendix D: Bounding Eve’s eavesdropping on Alice’s and Bob’s measurements
Denoting the equivalent operations in x−z plane as A1, A2, B1 and B2, their directions are
assumed to be θ1, θ2, ϕ1 and ϕ2 respectively. Similarly, denoting the equivalent operations
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in x′ − z′ plane as A′1, A′2, B′1 and B′2, the corresponding directions for them are θ′1, θ′2, ϕ′1
and ϕ′2. The state Eve prepares on Alice and Bob’s shared systems is ρAB = (1− p)ρ|Φ+〉 +
p1ρ|Φ−〉 + p2ρ|Ψ+〉 + p3ρ|Ψ−〉. Then S = (1 − p − p3)[cos(θ1 − ϕ1) + cos(θ1 − ϕ2) + cos(θ2 −
ϕ1) − cos(θ2 − ϕ2)] − (p1 − p2)[cos(θ1 + ϕ1) + cos(θ1 + ϕ2) + cos(θ2 + ϕ1) − cos(θ2 + ϕ2)]
can be obtained. Furthermore, the correlation results on neighbour bases can be depicted
as SA1B1 = (1 − p− p3) cos(θ1 − ϕ1)− (p1 − p2) cos(θ1 + ϕ1), SA1B2 = (1 − p− p3) cos(θ1 −
ϕ2)− (p1 − p2) cos(θ1 + ϕ2), SA2B1 = (1− p− p3) cos(θ2 − ϕ1)− (p1 − p2) cos(θ2 + ϕ1), and
−SA2B2 = (1 − p − p3) cos(θ2 − ϕ2)− (p1 − p2) cos(θ2 + ϕ2) respectively. The symmetry of
our DIQKD requires SA1B1 = SA1B2 = SA2B1 = −SA2B2 = S4 , then we have
(1− p− p3) cos(θ1 − ϕ1)− (p1 − p2) cos(θ1 + ϕ1),
= (1− p− p3) cos(θ1 − ϕ2)− (p1 − p2) cos(θ1 + ϕ2),
= (1− p− p3) cos(θ2 − ϕ1)− (p1 − p2) cos(θ2 + ϕ1),
= −(1− p− p3) cos(θ2 − ϕ2) + (p1 − p2) cos(θ2 + ϕ2).
(D1)
Based on these relationships, we can obtain
(1− p− p3) sin(2θ1−ϕ1−ϕ22 ) sin(ϕ1−ϕ22 ) = −(p1 − p2) sin(2θ1+ϕ1+ϕ22 ) sin(ϕ1−ϕ22 ),
(1− p− p3) sin(2ϕ1−θ1−θ22 ) sin( θ1−θ22 ) = −(p1 − p2) sin(2ϕ1+θ1+θ22 ) sin( θ1−θ22 ),
(1− p− p3) cos(2θ2−ϕ1−ϕ22 ) cos(ϕ1−ϕ22 ) = (p1 − p2) cos(2θ2+ϕ1+ϕ22 ) cos(ϕ1−ϕ22 ),
(1− p− p3) cos(2ϕ2−θ1−θ22 ) cos( θ1−θ22 ) = (p1 − p2) cos(2ϕ2+θ1+θ22 ) cos( θ1−θ22 ).
(D2)
As S should violate its classical bound 2, it is reasonable to assume that the value
p1+p2+p3 is small. Then (1−p−p3) is comparable with 1. If cos(ϕ1−ϕ22 ) = 0, cos( θ1−θ22 ) = 0,
sin(ϕ1−ϕ2
2
) = 0, or sin( θ1−θ2
2
) = 0, one can obtain S ≤ 2, which is not expected in DIQKD.
Then Eq. (D2) can be simplified as
(1− p− p3) sin(2θ1−ϕ1−ϕ22 ) = −(p1 − p2) sin(2θ1+ϕ1+ϕ22 ),
(1− p− p3) sin(2ϕ1−θ1−θ22 ) = −(p1 − p2) sin(2ϕ1+θ1+θ22 ),
(1− p− p3) cos(2θ2−ϕ1−ϕ22 ) = (p1 − p2) cos(2θ2+ϕ1+ϕ22 ),
(1− p− p3) cos(2ϕ2−θ1−θ22 ) = (p1 − p2) cos(2ϕ2+θ1+θ22 ).
(D3)
If both sides of Eq. (D3) are not equal to 0, one can obtain
sin(θ1 + θ2) + sin(θ1 − θ2) cos(ϕ1 + ϕ2) = 0,
sin(ϕ1 + ϕ2) + sin(ϕ1 − ϕ2) cos(θ1 + θ2) = 0.
(D4)
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We can find the maximal value conditioned on the relationships in (D4), we find S ≤ 2
in this condition. By further calculation, we can find that sin(2θ1+ϕ1+ϕ2
2
), sin(2ϕ1+θ1+θ2
2
),
cos(2θ2+ϕ1+ϕ2
2
), and cos(2ϕ2+θ1+θ2
2
) can not be equal to 0 at the assumption of S > 2. Then
we have p1 = p2 should be satisfied. And at the same time, we have θ2−θ1 = pi2 , ϕ2−ϕ1 = −pi2 ,
θ2−ϕ1 = pi4 and θ1−ϕ2 = pi4 , or θ2−θ1 = −pi2 , ϕ2−ϕ1 = pi2 , θ2−ϕ1 = −pi4 and θ1−ϕ2 = −pi4 .
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